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A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
CALIFORNIA CLOSE CORPORATION PROVISIONS
AND A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING
INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS
by Edwin J. Bradley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes the recently enacted California corporation
code1 as it pertains to the close corporation. The objectives and principles which should animate legislation governing the close corporation
are proffered as the basis of this analysis. In general, the article submits that close corporation legislation should do two things: (a) liberate close corporation planning, and (b) minimize unfair treatment
of minority shareholders. The conclusions arrived at are, first, that the
California statute accomplishes much but not all of the hoped-for contractual liberation of close corporation planning and that in some respects the provisions are not consistent with the fundamental policy
considerations which should guide close corporation legislation. Further, the article contends that a major area of unfinished business remains with respect to the second objective, that of minimizing unfair
treatment of minority shareholders in the close corporation. The article concludes with a proposal that a statute should define the close corporation on a mandatory basis and supplement that mandatory definition with provisions conferring upon each participant in the close
corporation certain presumptive minimum rights.
II.

POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF CLOSE CORPORATION
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

A. PlanningLiberation-TheContractualPrinciple
The preeminent purpose of close corporation legislation is to free
planning from senseless legal obstacles. The strong legislative trend'
* B.A., 1950 (Mt. St. Mary's College); LL.B., 1955 (Georgetown University); Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Law of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, § 7, [1975] Cal. Stat. - [hereinafter cited as GCL
or General Corporation Law].
The GCL will take effect on January 1, 1977. Amendments were adopted by enactment of the technical amendments bill, August 27, 1976, ch. 641, [1976] Cal. Stat. -.
These amendments are reflected in the article where relevant.
2. See for examples of comprehensive close corporation statutes DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
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is opposed to hobbling the close corporation by a set of rigidified prescriptions pertaining to how a corporation ought to be set up and operated. The foremost expectation from a particular close corporation
legislative reform is the declaration of a pervasive principle of freedom
of contractual planning so that the participants may adopt whatever arrangements they decide are useful and conducive to the success of their
venture. That principle should apply to every facet of the close corporation's affairs. The point should be made with the utmost clarity
that the price for limited liability and the corporate entity privilege is
not a planning straightjacket.
The California close corporation provisions require examination on
the basis of this first objective of close corporation legislation to determine whether they include a generous and comprehensive legitimization of arrangements pertaining to every important category of close
corporation planning. Those categories include shareholder voting;
guarantees of directorships; the functioning of the board of directors;
guarantees of employment and compensation; the mechanism and manner of formulating business policy; business administration and supervisory responsibilities and autonomy; financial policy and distribution
of profits; fundamental changes with respect to the capital structure or
otherwise; settling disagreements, resolving deadlock and dissolution;
and stock transfer restrictions.
B.

Protectionof IndividualParticipantsThe FiduciaryPrinciple

Close corporation legislation may also be expected to confront the
need to minimize unfairness and oppression of minority shareholders.
This is a problem which has been dealt with to some extent but inadequately by the courts.3 To date, close corporation legislation has
missed the boat on this point.
8, §§ 341-356 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 - 17-7216 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE
fit 4, §§ 4-101 - 4-603 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-1386 (1974); Tnx. CiV.
STAT. art. 2.30-1 - 2.30-5 (Supp. 1975).
As representative of treatment given by noncomprehensive statutory schemes see
shareholder provisions, GA. CODE ANN. § 22-611 (1970); MIce. CoMp,. LAws ANN. §
450.1463 (Supp. 1975); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-21 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. Corn'.
LAw § 620 (McKinney 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1216.22 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-714 (Supp. 1975).
3. In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr, 592 (1969),

Justice Traynor noted:
The increasingly complex transactions of the business and financial communities
demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional theories of fiduciary obligation as
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By de facto definition, the close corporation involves few participants
who are engaged in a business together on a fairly intimate personal
basis and in a relatively closely-knit relationship. That reality justifies
a natural presumption that each participant is meant to have certain
minimum rights. Moreover it justifies the presumption that each of
the participants understands and is sympathetic to the expectations
which each of the other participants has from the business relationship
and that each is willing to work for their mutual realization. It should
not be assumed that the associates in a close corporation have the right
to be primarily self-serving. The highly personal and closely-knit relationship makes a stringent fiduciary principle more appropriate as a
basis for defining the legal concepts to control that relationship.
In addressing the problem of unfairness and oppression in the close
corporation, legislation will have to first define the close corporation in
a manner which does not make that status merely optional. In addition, care must be taken to make sure that the substantive provisions do
not affirmatively assist the majority in effecting an unfair situation for
minority shareholders. Finally, the statute should formulate a set of
minimum rights which each participant is entitled to, however, only
presumptively and subject to the agreement of the parties. An equal
voice in management and an equal share of profits would deserve the
highest priority for inclusion in a catalogue of minimum rights, as would
the right to information about the business. Other rights may be similarly deduced from the innate features of the close corporation relationship. The objective is to protect individual participants against exclusion from management, employment, salaries, dividends or other forms
of corporate freeze-out, unless it is clear that what is happening is according to a compact unanimously arrived at. Legislation should nourish the principle that the close corporation is a cooperative undertaking
for the mutual benefit of all of the parties involved.
III. RESuME OF THE CALIFORNIA PROVISIONS OF
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 'CLOSE CORPORATION
The California legislative technique of regulating close corporations
is to intersperse special close corporation provisions among the general

provisions. No separate chapter segregates the special provisions.

A

tests of majority shareholder responsibility to the minority. These theories have
failed to afford adequate protection to minority shareholders and particularly to
those in closely held corporations ....

Id. at 111, 460 P.2d at 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
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"close corporation" is defined 4 and certain substantive provisions are

made applicable to those corporations.5

Other provisions relating to

its formation and termination are set forth. The general statutory pro-

visions apply to the close corporation unless the context requires
otherwise. 6 They often affect vital planning areas and provide useful
planning devices. The innovative special close corporation provisions

naturally command greater interest and have a more far-reaching
effect.

Section 158(g) lists all sections making specific reference to

the close corporation.7 A full assessment of the statute must take into
account the general provisions as well.
A.

The Definition

The definition of a close corporation found in section 158(a) of the

new California statute is simply a corporation whose articles say "this
corporation is a close corporation" 8 and limit the number of shareholders of record to a specific number which cannot exceed ten.9 These
are the only definitional elements." °
4. GCL, supra note 1, § 158(a).
5.Id.§ 186, 202(a), 204, 300, 418, 421, 706, 1111, 1201, 1800, 1904.
6.Id.§ 101.
7. Id.H9 186, 202(a), 204, 300, 418, 421, 706, 1111, 1201, 1800, 1904.
8. The close corporation is formed by means of the same mechanics used to form any
corporation. For example, sections 202 and 204 govern the mandatory and optional
provisions of the articles except that section 158 requires the additional close corporation
recitals. Section 202(a) requires that the name of a close corporation contain the word
"corporation," "incorporated" or "limited" or an abbreviation thereof. GCL, supra note
1, §§ 202, 204, 158, 202(a).
9. Section 158(d) of the GCL permits counting husband and wife as one shareholder,
as well as a corporation, partnership or trust, unless formed deliberately for the purpose
of evading the number limit. For Subchapter S purposes, section 1371(a) (2) of the
INTERNAL REvNuE CoDE of 1954 allows only an individual, other than an estate, to be a
shareholder but section 1371(c) does permit counting husband and wife as one shareholder. However, Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(d) (1968) treats each joint, common or
entirety tenant, other than a husband and wife, as a separate shareholder and further
states in (e) that a corporation in which any shareholder is a corporation, trust or
partnership does not qualify. Voting trusts are not trusts for Subchapter S purposes. A.
& N. Furniture and Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
For purposes of meeting the California securities exemption requirement of ten or less
beneficial owners, CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 25102(h) (West Supp. 1976) allows husband and wife to be counted as one. Commissioner's Rule 102.5 states that securities
held by a partnership or joint venture are deemed to be beneficially owned by each
partner or venturer and securities held by a trust are deemed owned by each of the
beneficiaries. 10 CAL. ADM. CoDE § 260.102.5.
10. Although DEL. CODE, ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1) (1974) is the source of the
definition, see CALiOnNrrA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY CMMrITEE ON CORPORATIONS,
ExPosuRE DRAFT No. 2: GENERAL CoPPORATION LAW 6 (Oct. 4, 1974) [hereinafter
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The Key Substantive Provisions: Sections 300(b) and 706(a)

Sections 300(b) and 706(a) comprise the substantive heart of the
special provisions validating close corporation planning arrangements.
The former section is the most revolutionary in effect among the new
provisions. This provision relates to "shareholders' agreements,""
which effect any phase of the affairs of the close corporation, including
but not limited to, the management of the business, the division of its
profits and the distribution of its assets upon liquidation. Such shareholders' agreements are defined in a way which require the assent of
all the shareholders. Section 706(a) validates close corporation shareholder voting agreements, among two or more shareholders.
IV.

THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS-WHAT Do THEY ACCOMPLSH?

Assume a new venture is in formation. The parties, each with their
respective and relative bargaining power, are all deeply involved in the
planning and bargaining process. A deal is struck involving novel and
drastic departures from the usual ways of corporate life. What degree
of legal certainty attaches to the arrangements agreed upon? To what
extent can the special close corporation provisions be counted on to sustain their validity?
A.

Section 300(b): ShareholderAgreements

1. Agreements Adopting Partnership Practices
Both counsel and the business associates seek the utmost in legal certainty for planning arrangements intended to protect themselves and
assure realization of management and profit sharing expectations. For
that reason, the statute should be free as possible from ambiguity and
should not invite unintended narrowing constructions or interpretations.
The claim may be made with great force that the intent of the draftsmen of the new California general corporation law must have been to
legitimatize, on a sweeping basis, close corporation planning agreements. However, section 300(b) is not as specific and comprehensive
cited as ExposuRE DRAr No. 2], the California draftsmen wisely jettisoned the
definitional prohibition found in the Delaware section against a public offering under the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (1970). Few concepts suffer from
more uncertainty. The Delaware shareholder ceiling of 30, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
342(a) (1) (1974), was also departed from.
11. GCL, supra note 1, § 186.
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as it could be and its negative and eccentric form detracts from its clarity and force.
Section 300(b) provides in pertinent part:
[N]o shareholders' agreement, which relates to any phase of the affairs
of a close corporation, including but not limited to management of its
business, division of its -profits or distribution of its assets on liquidation,
shall be invalid as between the parties thereto on -the ground ... that
it is an attempt to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or
to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be appropriate
only between partners. 12

"Shareholders' agreement" is defined as a written agreement among
all of the shareholders of a close corporation.' 3
The drafting model followed in section 300(b) traces back to the

pioneer effort in close corporation legislation, i.e., the North Carolina
statute. 14 Two things stand out about the drafting technique employed:
the negative thrust, that no agreement shall be invalid, and the refer-

ence to two specific rationales for possible invalidation. The tentativeness and indirect approach may have been understandable in the hos-

tile legal environment facing the North Carolina draftsmen. Today, a
straightforward affirmation of the validity of close corporation shareholders' agreements would be more fitting.
12. Id. § 300(b).
13. Id. § 186.
Transferees of shares are covered by the obligations of a section 300(b) shareholders'
agreement if that agreement is (a) filed for inspection with the secretary of the
corporation and (b) the purchaser has actual knowledge thereof or notice by a
notation provided for in section 418(c). The transferee ceases to be a party unless
he was a party to the contract in a capacity other than as a shareholder. The transferee
must then consent to any change in the contract unless a change upon consent of less
than all the shareholders is provided for in the contract. Transferees of shares are also
bound by shareholder voting agreements entered into under section 706(a) and
irrevocable proxies under section 705(e), if the transferee has actual notice or if a
statement of the fact of such arrangements appears on the stock certificate as provided in
section 418(c). GCL, supranote 1, §§ 300(b), 418(c), 706(a), 705(e).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) and (c) (1975). See Latty, The Close Corporation
and the New North Carolina Business CorporationAct, 34 N. CAR. L. REv. 432 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Lattyl.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350, 354 (1974) seem to have the same ancestry as
GCL, supra note 1, § 300(b). California consolidates the "partnership" and "directordiscretion" rationales into a single section and cleans up the confusion and contradictions
of the North Carolina and Delaware sections. This was something of a near miss since
the - ExosuRa DRAFT No. 2, supra note 10, was hopelessly muddled providing for
partnership-type arrangements on the vote of all the shareholders and validated "directordiscretion" contracts if entered into by "all or less than all" of the shareholders. Id. at
24.
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The chief draftsman of the North Carolina close corporation provisions has described the "incorporated partnership" language as serving
merely to set a friendly tone which might prove useful in unanticipated cases not specifically covered, but the function was chiefly envisioned as a basic philosophy provision. 5 That function would be fine

if the statute were to proceed to affirmatively validate agreements involving a comprehensive and specific catalogue of close corporation
planning matters. 6
Courts might pronounce a contract bad for reasons other than those
specified, although the reason should have to be a very good one if
all of the shareholders have consented. However, instead of having
to depend on that hope, planners would be better off with the protection of statutory language which directly and flatly validates the agreements and does not invite the invention of other nullifying rationales.Y
The earnest hope is that the California courts will resist the temptation

to invent other reasons to strike down shareholders' agreements.

The

purpose and spirit of the California legislation was clearly to liberate

close corporation planning from legal doubt to a pervasive extent. 8
The legislature should be understood as acknowledging the vital need

for creative close corporation shareholders' agreements and their great
15. Latty, supra note 14, at 438.
16. Maryland exemplifies a straightforward drafting techinique. Section 4-401 of the
Maryland Code provides:
(a) Governing the corporation-Undera unanimous stockholders' agreement,
the stockholders of a close corporation may regulate any aspect of the affairs of
the corporation or the relations of the stockholders, including:
(1) The management of the business and affairs of the corporation;
(2) Restrictions on the transfer of stock;
(3) The right of one or more stockholders to dissolve the corporation at will
or on the occurrence of a specified event or contingency;
(4) The exercise or division of voting power;
(5) The terms and conditions of employment of an officer or employee of the
corporation, without regard to the period of his employment;
(6) The individuals who are to be directors and officers of the corporation; and
(7) The payment of dividends or the division of profits.
(b) Amending unanimous stockholders' agreement-A unanimous stockholders'
agreement may be amended, but only by the unanimous written consent of the
stockholders then parties to the agreement.
MD. ANN. CO E tit. 4, § 4-401 (1975) (emphasis in original). See also Tax. Rnv.
Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
17. California precedents conform to the customary theme at common law that
management by the board may not be made the subject of contractual deviation. See,
e.g., Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823
(1953); Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 18 P.2d 393 (1933).
But see Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 202 P.2d 748
(1949).
18. See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, CLosE CORFORAriONS: LAW AND PRACTicE §§ 5.04.06 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NWEAL].
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utility as investment incentives and bulwarks against unfairness or op9
pression.3
2.

Agreements Interfering with Board Discretion

The California statute fails to expressly provide for the option of
management of the close corporation directly and exclusively by the
shareholders. Authorization for' a governance system which abandons
the traditional board of directors is found in several of the leading close
corporation statutes. 20 The argument can be made that section 300
(b), along with sections 204(d) and 212(b),2' support a close corporation arrangement which abolishes the board. Section 300(b) provides in pertinent part:
[N]o shareholders' agreement which relates to any phase of the affairs
of a close corporation, including but not limited to management of its
business, division of its profits or distribution of its assets on liquidation,
shall be invalid as between the parties thereto on the ground that it so
relates to the conduct 'as to interfere with the discretion of the board
22

In combination, those sections may permit a complete "sterilization"
of the board of directors as a partnership-type modification. However,
the pointed omission from the statute of a shareholder-management
provision similar to those of other statutes places that possible construction of the statute very much in doubt. That conclusion creates a disturbing thought about the scope of section 300(b). If that section cannot be construed as allowing the abolition of the board of directors,
then what is the limit upon shareholders' agreements which restrict the
discretion of the board of directors? If the discretion of the board may
be inhibited only up to a point, a pall is cast over the prospects that
19. A shareholders' agreement under section 300(b) may not waive or alter certain
statutory provisions which are set forth in section 300(c). Contractual tampering with
the definition of a close corporation is forbidden. For example, the parties can't
agree that instead of the statutory 10, the maximum number of shareholders is to
be 20. Nor may an agreement excuse compliance with the regulations of dividends
and share purchases, GCL, supra note 1, §§ 500, 501. And the proscription also applies
to sections 1111 and 1201 (special voting on mergers and reorganizations which terminate close corporation status); Chapter 15 (corporate records and reports); Chapter 16
(inspection rights); Chapter 18 (involuntary dissolution); and Chapter 22 (crimes and
penalties). GCL, supra note 1, §§ 300(b), 300(c), 1111, 1201.
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE tit. 4, § 4-303
(1975); Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-1(G) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
21. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text for discussion of GCL, supra note
1, §§ 204(d) and 212(b).
22. GCL, supra note 1,§ 300(b).
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section 300(b) liberates close corporation planning from needless legal
uncertainty. A way out for the courts, if they are sympathetic to the
purpose of this legislation and want to see it accomplish a full measure
of the intended reform, is to construe section 300(b), buttressed by
sections 204(d) and 212(b), as permitting shareholder management.
That is, after all, the logical outcome of the incorporated partnership
concept. It is also consistent with the spirit and policy behind the close
corporation portions of the statute. If management and ownership
overlap, removing an unnecessary tier of bureaucracy makes sense, for
in the close corporation centralized management is not a needed expedient.
A construction of section 300(b) as allowing the total abolition of
the board of directors would clear the air but it is not particularly necessary in terms of solving a practical need in close corporation planning.
Shareholder management is not a planning alternative that is vitally
needed in order to solve planning problems which cannot be solved
in any other way. If the substantive provisions respecting shareholders' agreements restricting director discretion and shareholder voting
agreements are generously construed so as to uphold all manner of arrangements not shown to be positively harmful to creditor or other interests in a rational sense, shareholder management as such is not really
needed to accomplish any planning goal not otherwise attainable. That
is to say, once close corporation planning is relieved from serious legal
doubt as to agreements which impinge upon the free exercise of discretion by the board of directors, the pressure is lifted to resort to
shareholder management as an end run around the common law objections concerning limiting board discretion.
Whether director management or shareholder management is used,
the fundamental planning questions are the same. Who is to make
what decisions and by what vote? Management directly by the shareholders does not inherently solve any important planning problem except that it eliminates the need to guarantee particular shareholders a
directorship. But that is a simple thing to do through cumulative voting, classes of stock or shareholders' voting agreements. The gain in
avoiding director meeting formalities is slight in the close corporation.
Also, there is a real human problem in trying to do business in the
market place as a corporation with no board of directors. Such a creature is a strange animal indeed to, for example, the traditionalist bank
loan officer for whom novelty is calamity.
The absence of the shareholder management option from the California statute may have stemmed from a nagging worry about veil
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piercing induced by the use of innovative corporation arrangements.
The statute does bespeak that concern even as to the seemingly less
revolutionary section 300(b) permission to restrict the discretion of directors. The courts are exhorted to refrain from penetrating the corporation shield by section 300(e) which provides:
The failure of a close corporation to observe corporate formalities relating to meetings of directors or shareholders in connection with
the management of its affairs, pursuant to an agreement authorized by
subdivision (b), shall not be considered a factor tending to establish
that the shareholders have personal liability for corporate obligations. 3
The fervent hope is that section 300(e) will convince the courts to conclude that limited liability is compatible with a corporate governance
structure that varies from the ancient rites of the corporation.
B.

Section 706(a): ShareholderVoting Agreements

1. Validation of Agreements: Self-Execution Devices
Section 706(a) deals with a much less embattled common law sector, shareholder voting agreements. Its language would seem to confer
a carte blanche upon the business associates and their counsel to map
out whatever allocation or division of voting power and whatever manner of exercising the voting right they find suitable and serviceable,
no matter how unorthodox or imaginative. Some of the general sections also support the highly flexible use of traditional methods of structuring decision-making in the corporation and will be described below. 24
Section 706(a) imposes no time limitation on shareholder voting
agreements. 5 The section contains a strong exhortation to the courts
to specifically enforce voting agreements despite the absence of the
traditional equity jurisdictional requirement, inadequacy of a remedy
at law. But the planner will always seek self-executing mechanisms
for shareholder voting agreements. Lawsuits are a wholly futile device
23. Id. § 300(e).
24. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
25. A ten year limitation on shareholder agreements is imposed by DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 218(c) (1974). It was both a good and a bad idea not to copy that limitation.
Since section 706(a) of the GCL applies strictly to a close corporation, unlike the
Delaware provision, no justification for a time limit exists if all shareholders are required
to be parties. If a time limit is thought to be useful in a given case, the parties may fix
it for themselves. In this application, the limitation would be a bad idea. However, the
section also applies to agreements between two or more shareholders. A ten-year
limitation seems a good idea in a statute which does not require all shareholders to
consent. The limitation would prevent perpetual control alliances among less than all of
the shareholders.
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for getting the shares voted in the way promised. Hence, irrevocable
proxies and voting trusts were conceived. Section 706(a) appears to
suggest a distinctive kind of special close corporation transfer of stock
to third persons for voting purposes in conjunction with voting agreements. What that really means and does is not clear. The most obvious guess is that the provision is meant to deal with a situation where,
for example, two shareholders agree to vote in unison and agree to arbitration by a third person if they cannot concur on the manner of voting.2 6 But the problem with the statute is the same one which plagued
efforts of this same kind at common law-is the transfer to the arbitrator, if that is what is envisioned by section 706(a), revocable or not?
If a lawsuit is needed to vindicate the third person's right to retain and
vote the stock, the method is unsatisfactory and inferior to either the
proxy, if it can be made irrevocable, or the voting trust.
Section 706(b), a general provision, is a standard voting trust provision, though new in California in some respects. It stipulates compliance with the usual voting trust formalities and fixes a ten year time
limitation. Section 706(c) makes clear that a voting agreement which
is not in compliance with the formal voting trust statutory requirements
is not to be nullified for that reason. Hence, it is possible to escape
the rigid ten year limitation of the voting trust by use of the section
706(a) agreement. In most cases that will be desirable. But, the possible revocability of the section 706(a) transfer of the stock for voting
purposes remains as a problem. Section 705(e) makes a proxy irrevocable if it is given to a person designated in a section 706(a) close
corporation shareholders' voting agreement.
Since a section 706
(a) agreement is not subject to any time limitation, and the proxy's
life is coextensive, the use of the irrevocable proxy seems to be indicated as the most clearcut self-enforcement mechanism under this statute.2 8 That may well be the outcome intended by the nebulous transfer referred to in section 706(a).
26. See Ringling Bros. - Barnum & Bailey Combined Show, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 A.2d
441 (Del. 1948).
27. A proxy is also rendered irrevocable if it is held by a pledgee, a purchaser or person who has agreed to purchase, or an optionee, a creditor if given to extend or continue
credit, a person who has contracted to perform services as employer of the corporation if
stated to be in consideration therefor. GCL, supra note 1, § 705(e).
28. Section 418(a) (3) requires a statement on the share certificate that the shares are
subject to a voting agreement under section 706 or an irrevocable proxy under section
705(e). Otherwise section 418(b) makes those arrangements unenforceable against
transferees of shares without actual knowledge. GCL, supra note 1, §§ 418(a)(3), 706,
705(e), 418(b).
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Section 706(a) seems to validate voting arrangements on a broad
front and then provide, in conjunction with section 705 (e), for a legally
certain self-execution device. Where all of the shareholders are participating in the bargaining and planning, that seems the only relevant question.
2. Policy Difficulties With Validation of Voting Agreements
Among Less Than All of the Shareholders
Judicial thought in the twentieth century turned to the view that
shareholder voting agreements were not legally suspect29 as were contracts which compromised the independent judgment of the directors.
A conceptual block involved in the general thinking about close corporations led to an insistence on assigning the few shareholders of the
close corporation discrete roles as shareholders and as directors. That
insistence traces to orthodox thinking about corporate governance
which saddled the close corporation with stereotyped normative statutory provisions and judicial predilections about how a corporation
should be run. For corporations of more widely held shares it made
sense to assert that when shareholders act as shareholders they can be
expected to seek their own selfish interests with vigor,30 to fight for
control and attempt formation of control alliances to gain control, while
as directors they exercise power primarily for the benefit of all of the
shareholders. In the latter capacity, they serve as fiduciary representative to the corporation and to the shareholders collectively. The unreality of the distinction is well understood today as it pertains to the
close corporation. 31 For example, we have seen that under section
300(b) the hands of the directors may be tied by contract, but it must
32
be done by means of a compact unanimously arrived at.
The partnership theme embraced in section 300(b) should be followed in section 706(a). Partnership law has always recognized a demanding fiduciary duty among partners. 3 Close corporation legislation should disavow the idea that shareholders in a close corporation
29. See O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 5.04.
30. Of course, significant progress has been made in the courts in holding controlling
shareholders to reasonably civilized standards of behavior. Jones v. Ahmanson, 1 Cal.
3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969), is outstanding in this respect and will
continue to exert great influence. See, e.g., Boume v. Jutkowicz, No. CA 000268 (L.A.
Super. Ct. Calif., Nov. 19, 1975).
31. See O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 1.07.
32. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
33. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERsHrp AcT § 21.
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can be expected as a primary matter to pursue their own individual
selfish interest. Voting agreements should comport with the same contractual and fiduciary considerations which underlie the requirements
for the executing of agreements affecting director action. The variance in treatment in the statute between "director discretion" agreements and "shareholder voting" agreements is a vestige of the discredited common law dichotomy.3 4 The same mutual interdependence and need for the highest trust and confidence call for confining
shareholder voting agreements to cases where all of the shareholders

agree to them. 5
The common law rule which tolerated agreements governing voting
among any number of shareholders seems to have been accepted un-

critically as an appropriate close corporation statutory provision. 0 But
on analysis, that rule seems inappropriate. It should not be supposed

that vital interests are not at stake.

Shareholder voting agreements

may erect voting patterns which effect a freeze-out against minority
shareholders. As a result, the investment of those shareholders may
be rendered unproductive and the business relationship entirely uncon37
genial for them.
34. A recent case applying the "corporate business opportunity" aspect of the duty of
loyalty manifests an awareness of the meaninglessness of any distinction between a
person as a shareholder and as a director for purposes of that doctrine. The court held
that competition with the corporation could not be justified unless status as a director,
officer and shareholder was terminated. Cain v. Cain, 334 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. Ct. App.
1975).
35. The law cannot decree equality of bargaining power. The right to use most
effectively whatever bargaining clout a person has, can and should be assured. However,
once the majority makes a deal and the law provides enforcement, as section 706(a) of
the GCL provides, the minority shareholder is helpless. The fact that the statute makes
the agreement valid only as between the parties doesn't mean that the shareholder who is
shut out may realistically expect to be able to gain protection from a declaration of
invalidity. That seems to be the intended outcome of the statutory language. If the
agreement is valid as between the parties and they are threatened by a damage action for
non-performance, the coercion to conform to the contract seems to assure that conformity.
36. See, e.g., GCL, supra note 1, § 706(a).
37. E.g., Ringling Bros. - Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 A.2d
441 (Del. 1948). The two Ringling sisters agreed to vote the stock they owned in unison. By doing so they would control the board of directors and hence the business policy
of the corporation and they would make employment, dividend and other crucial
decisions. If the third shareholder, eyes open, willingly assumed the status as minority
shareholder understanding that a permanent coalition was in control and that through
cumulative voting he was to have representation on the board but no guarantee beyond
that, the arrangement may be proper. If the business deal is attractive and the minority
shareholder is willing to run the risks, that is his choice to make. But if a corporation is
routinely formed by three equal shareholders, an alliance created later by two of them is
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The statute, as noted, may properly be looked to for the broadest
feasible validation of shareholder agreements in the close corporation,
whether relating to what "shareholders" do or what "directors" do.
However, in both cases that should require the consent of all of the
business associates. Agreements among less than all should be left to
seek validation by courts only if those who claim validity are able to
show that the agreement can pass a stiff test of nonprejudice to shareholders who are not parties.
C.

Effect of End of Close CorporationStatus on
Shareholders'Agreements

A close corporation shareholders' agreement which involves partnership-like arrangements or invades the board's discretion is terminated by section 300(b) upon the termination of close corporation
status. Section 706(a) causes a similar termination for voting agreements. The statute might better have provided that the agreements
survive to the extent they are valid under the general statutory provisions or at common law, unless the agreement itself provides for termination or termination is agreed to by all of the shareholders at the time
the close corporation status is divested."" This would best preserve the
original intentions of the parties.
A question left unanswered by sections 300(b) and 706(a) is
whether the shareholders of a close corporation may agree that the
agreements are to continue in effect in the event of termination of close
corporation status. If shareholders have a backstop shareholders' agreement to govern the relationship as a non-close corporation will it be
enforceable? Another way of raising the same question is to ask
whether shareholder agreements which impinge on board discretion or
affect shareholder voting are valid under the general provisions as applicable to a non-close corporation or at common law in California.
The decrees of termination of the -shareholders' agreements found
in sections 300(b) and 706(a) do not necessarily have to be read as
essentially unfair to and is inconsistent with the reasonable and justifiable expectations
of the third shareholder.
38. See, e.g., Tax. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1975) which
provides that:
If an agreement authorized by this Article contains any provisions which would
not be valid under other provisions of the Act, such provisions shall be valid only
so long as the corporation maintains its status as a close corporation under this
Act. No other provision of the agreement shall be affected unless the parties
thereto otherwise provide.
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meaning that agreements of the same general kind are not valid in a
non-close corporation. They do imply that position because they pointedly apply to only the close corporation. But section 706(c) provides
that the section does not invalidate any voting or other agreement
among shareholders not otherwise illegal. While the statute does not
elsewhere contain a provision applicable to all corporations validating
shareholder voting agreements, at common law shareholder agreements
were usually sustained. 9 If the close corporation shareholders plainly
agree that upon termination of close corporation status a backstop shareholder voting agreement is to become operative, the chances
are good that it will be a valid agreement.
Absent close corporation status, the validity of a shareholders' agreement which impinges on board discretion is a much more troublesome
point. Nothing in the statute even hints at validity and the common
law picture is cloudy. If all of the shareholders are parties to the agreement, it may be valid if it doesn't go too far in compromising the board's
classic prerogative to manage the business with an exercise of independent discretion.
V. GENERAL STATUTORY PRovIsIoNs AFFECTING
CORPORATION PLANNING FREEDOM

A.

GovernanceIn General

Section 300(a) is the typical provision stating that the board shall
manage. But that "norm" is made subject to a-broad proviso: "[s]ubject to. . . limitations in the articles relating to action required to be
.o Section 204(d) permits the arapproved by the shareholders ...
ticles to contain "[a]ny other provision, not in conflict with the law,

for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of
."41 Section 212(b) permits the bylaws to contain
the corporation ..
any provision, not in conflict with law or articles, for the management
of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation,
including the qualifications, duties and compensation of directors; appointment and authority of committees of the board; and the appointment, duties, compensation and tenure of officers. Section 312(b)
provides that officers shall be chosen by the board and serve at the
pleasure of the board except as otherwise provided in the articles, bylaws or board resolution.
39. See O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 5.04.
40. GCL, supra note 1, § 300(a).
41. Id. § 204(d).
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These are traditional provisions and their approximate counterparts
are present in many corporation statutes. Courts have not been inclined toward viewing them as legislative sanction for adventuresome
contractual variations from the stereotyped, normative statutory corporate model. However, the effect of the enactment of a new California statute including close corporation provisions evidencing a public
policy favoring flexibility of planning may be to give these provisions
a new and real significance for corporation planning flexibility, at least
in the close corporation. 2 If a corporation does not elect the special
close corporation status, these sections, if construed generously as the
literal language invites, along with the other general provisions described hereafter, seem to provide a legislative basis for flexible planning almost as broad as the special close corporation provisions. But
that may be a highly disputed matter in terms of legislative intent. It
may be argued that a corporation must clearly identify itself as a legislative close corporation in order to make special planning arrangements
legally acceptable.
B.

Voting of Shares; Classesof Stock

Great planning latitude emerges from the collection of provisions in
the area of voting of shares and stock classification. Shareholder voting is subject to a rule of one share, one vote43 but variations are possible; more or less than one vote per share may be conferred,44 classes
of stock with different voting features may be created, 4ri debt securities
may be given a voting right46 and the planner may employ shareholder
voting agreements, 47 voting trusts, 48 and irrevocable proxies .4 Section
42. DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 102(b) (1) (1974) similarly provides for provisions
regarding corporate management to be contained in the certificate of incorporation. The
chairman of the drafting committee has commented by saying that section 102(b) (1) of
the Delaware Code confers power to include any provision deemed appropriate for the
conduct of corporate affairs. This includes stockholder power to embody in the charter
a provision departing from the common law rules, provided that it does not transgress a
statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in the
General Corporation Law itself. E. FoLK, THE DELAwARE GENERAL CORuORAbON
LAw: A COMMENTARY Am ANALYsIs 10 (1972).
43. GCL, supra note 1, § 700(a).
44. Id. § 112. This section is not explicit authority for allowing more or less than one

vote per share. Rather, it makes specific reference to such a possibility in determining
what a majority of shares means. Implicitly, therefore, disproportionate voting is valid.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

400 (a).
204(a) (7).
706(d).
706(b).

49. Id.§ 705(e)(5).
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418 requires a statement to be placed upon the share certificate of
whatever voting restrictions are imposed upon the stock of a close cor-

poration in order to make the restriction effective against a transferee
of shares without actual notice.
If classes of stock are used, a careful and detailed delineation of the
special rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions must be undertaken in the articles or "shareholders' agreement."' 0 Section 301(a)

specifically allows the use of a class of stock to elect a certain number
of directors, a very prevalent use of classes of stock. The use of classes

of stock has other planning applications and is a highly effective planning device.5 1
C. Cumulative Voting

Section 708 perpetuates a California corporation statutory trademark
---compulsory availability of cumulative voting. Cumulative voting
50. Id. § 203.
51. As admirable a device as stock classification may be for general corporate
planning purposes, Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code and the requirements of
the California Securities Law exemptions furnish disincentives to its use. The planner
must do some adroit juggling. For Subchapter S purposes, classes of stock are not
permitted. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 1371(a). An exception is where the qualities or
characteristics of the stock of all classes are identical and the voting power is proportionate to the number of shares owned. Treas. Reg. 1.371-1(g) (1968). Thus, if there are
three classes of common stock each consisting of 100 shares and each with the right to
elect one director to a three person board of directors, and in all other respects the shares
are identical as to their rights the stock will be deemed to be a single class. Id. Clearly,
voting and non-voting classes of shares may not be used nor may shares with disproportionate voting power. It has been held that if voting andodividend differences between
classes are compelled by the Corporation Commissioner, Subchapter S status is lost.
Paige v. United States, 36 Am.Fed. Tax R.2d 75-5408 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Debt securities
may constitute a second class of stock, and provisions in the articles which confer voting
power disproportionate to the percentage of stock ownership are in grievous danger of
having the effect of creating more than one class of stock for Subchapter S purposes. It
seems now to be established at least that voting trusts, irrevocable proxies and shareholder voting agreements are safe and will not be given that effect if they are not formally
created by the articles, whatever sense there may be in that distinction. Parker Oil Co.,
58 T.C. 985 (1972); Rev. Rul. 73-611, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 312. See generally 7 CCH
STANDARD FED. TAX REP. 4846C.20-.47 (1976); 4 P-H 1976 FED. TAXES
33,367. Section 203 of the GCL, which allows various arrangements affecting voting of shares to
be contained in a shareholders' agreement, would seem to have some potential importance in this regard.
The California Securities Law grants an exemption for a close corporation which is
defined by resort to certain criteria, one of which is that the corporation have a single
class of voting common stock. CAL. CoRP. CoDE ANN. § 25102(h) (West Supp. 1976).
Debt securities evidently are not subject to the charge that they constitute a second
class of stock 10 CAL. AMM. CODE § 260.102.4. No reason exists to think that
shareholder agreements, proxies, voting trusts or anything of the sort will jeopardize the
exemption.
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may serve well as a planning measure in a particular situation, but the
planner must protect its efficacy by supplemental provisions controlling
the number of directors52 to be elected and the number of shares outstanding. Presumably, since the statute does not indicate otherwise,
the cumulative voting provision does not ban the use of non-voting
stock, or classes of stock with special director-voting rights. Nor are
shareholder voting agreements inconsistent with a cumulative voting
system.
D. High Vote and Quorum Requirements
High vote and quorum requirements are useful in providing shareholders with vetoes against action detrimental to their interests which
cannot be stopped under conventional voting patterns. The familiar
shareholder quorum (majority of shares entitled to vote) and voting
(majority of those present) rules are statutory rules of thumb made
subject, however, to provisions otherwise in the articles.5 8 Section 204
(a)(5) authorizes a provision in the articles requiring a higher vote
than specified in the statute, with some exceptions.5 4 High shareholder quorum and voting requirements are thus at the almost full disposal of the planner where their use is deemed expedient.55
E. Directors
Section 301 requires the annual election of directors. The election
is conducted by a plurality vote procedure 6 which is not subject to
a high-vote requirement.5 7 But denial *ofthe chance to require unanimous election of directors is not a planning calamity. Other ways to
guarantee directorships abound.58 Directors serve the term for which
52. Section 212(a) of the GCL provides guidelines for the maximum and minimum
number of directors.
53. GCL, supra note 1, § 602(a).
54. Section 204(a) (5) of the GCL, through its express exclusion of section 303 from
its terms, precludes an increase in the statutory number of votes which, if cast against a
director's removal without cause, will block that action. Cumulative voting and class
voting are thereby protected. Plurality election of directors commanded by section 708
may not be altered, nor may the section 1900 provision commanding a fifty percent
shareholder vote for voluntary dissolution.
55. To insure maximum safety, a careful planner will expressly provide that any high
shareholder quorum or voting requirement is also applicable to shareholder action by
consent in writing, taken pursuant to section 603 (a) of the GCL.
56. GCL, supra note 1, § 708(c).
57. id. § 204(a) (5).

58. For example, classes of stock, id. § 400, shareholder agreements, id. § 706(d),
voting trusts, id. § 706(b) and irrevocable proxies id. § 705(e) (5).
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elected or until successors are elected but are subject to removal without cause by a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares,59 with a
limitation designed to protect the cumulative voting right. Obviously,
careful planning will protect against removal in any case unless there
is excellent reason to allow it.
A mild inflexibility limits the use of the one or two-person board
of directors to the one or two-shareholder corporation, respectively,
otherwise the board must consist of three directors.6" Where there are
more than two shareholders, some other method of lodging control of
the business in the hands of one or two must be found. Classes of
stock, if not ruled out for other reasons, would be a workable method.
Section 300(b) is clearly intended to be used for such arrangement
in the statutory close corporation.
Director action may be made subject to a high-vote requirement.6 '
Section 300(b) limits agreements interfering with board discretion to
close corporations and requires the approval of all shareholders. The
agreement terminates with close corporation status. In non-close corporations, such agreements are of doubtful validity. Nothing in the
statute speaks to that point.
F.

Amendments of the Articles

A standard amendment provision prescribes approval by the board
2
of an amendment resolution and approval by the outstanding shares;
that is, approval by a majority of the outstanding shares entitled
to vote,63 subject to statutory64 or agreed-upon class voting requirements. A higher vote may be required under section 204(a)(5).
Ordinarily, high vote requirements would be indicated as a protective
measure for minority participants, but that is a matter of sound planning and bargaining in a particular case.
G. Bylaws

The bylaws may be adopted, amended or repealed by the board or
59. Id. "§303(a).
60. Id. § 212(a).
61. Id. § 204(a) (5).
Proper planning dictates that any high-vote requirement be expressly applicable to
director action taken by written consent, pursuant to section 307(f) of the GCL.
62. GCL, supra note 1, § 902(a).
63. Id. § 152.
64. Id. § 903(a).
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by approval of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, 65 subject as well
to high-vote requirements under section 204(a)(5).
H.

Officers, Agents, Employees

Section 312(a) requires the corporation to have a chairman of the
board or a president or both, a secretary and a chief financial officer
and such others with such duties as shall be determined by the board
or stated in the bylaws. Section 312(b) permits the officers to be
chosen as provided for in the bylaws and their tenure may be governed
by the bylaws. Hence, this matter is not one of director monopoly and
is not, therefore, invariably within the common law no man's land of
action involving board discretion. The critical planning questions of
who is to be an employee, at what salary and for what tenure, may
be answered through the use of bylaw provisions within shareholder
voting prerogatives and supplemented by shareholder vetoes and other
devices relating to shareholder action.
I.

Purpose Clause

Section 202(b) permits the use in the articles of what is called an
"all-purpose" clause. Limitations may, however, be imposed on the
authorized scope of the business. Since stockholders often want protection against expansion or diversification, careful planning requires
close attention to this matter. The automatic use of the "all-purpose"
clause may be contrary to diligent counselling.
J.

CapitalStructureand FinancialProvisions

Section 202 is a typical provision requiring a charter provision authorizing the corporation to issue a specified number of shares. Sections 400, 202(e) and 301(a) are also not exceptional provisions but
they are of enormous utility to the close corporation planner. Those
sections combine to allow the use of classes of stock with different dividend, liquidation and other rights, preferences or characteristics. Since
the statute allows voting rights to be conferred on debt securities, any
review of the use of debt or equity securities may now include the use
of voting debt, which may seem strange to many lawyers but can be
an excellent answer to a particular planning need.
Section 204(a)(2) allows the articles to provide for preemptive
rights, which may be valuable in particular situations but which are no
65. Id. § 211.
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panacea for the problems which beset the planning of the authorized
stock level, the procedures for its increase, the issuance of stock and
its price. Perhaps no planning area is as bedeviled. A dilemma confronts the planner at the incorporation stage. On the one hand, there
is the desirability of providing each participant with a guarantee against
future stock issuance which distorts the voting and property proportions
carefully worked out in the planning stage. Future issuances may also
unfairly dilute existing interests. Pricing close corporation stock is a
difficult and uncertain art. They may induce unwanted associates
and have the effect of transforming the enterprise into a much larger
and different business than the one bargained for by a shareholder.
On the other hand, financial needs may someday compel resort to
the issuance of additional stock. Some of the participants may someday believe excellent business opportunities exist which may be exploited best by issuing more stock. At some future time, a public
offering of stock may be greatly desired by some shareholders as the
best way to realize their paper profits by giving them the benefit of
a public market. Prospective employees or other persons who have
special things to offer the company may be available only if they are
allowed to become stockholders.
The statute cannot solve the problem in a given case of how to plan
for the present and future capacity of the corporation to issue stock
and what procedures must be followed in so doing. The statute provides the needed planning flexibility by allowing high-vote requirements for charter amendments66 and by allowing shareholder voting
agreements,6 7 irrevocable proxies,68 and close corporation shareholders'
agreements which infringe upon board discretion.6 9 Planning solutions
providing for absolute vetoes against, or high shareholder or director
votes to bring about, any change in the authorized or issued stock are
clearly lawful; or the matter can be left to ordinary voting majorities.
Moreover, any imaginative solution for this planning problem, involving
perhaps the use of special classes of stock or which relates new stock
issuances to demonstrable financial need or which might provide methods designed to protect against issuances at unfair prices or which provides for mandatory or optional buy-outs of stockholders, may lawfully
be resorted to.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. § 204(a)(5).
Id. § 706(a).
Id. § 705(e) (5).
Id. § 300(b).
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K. Considerationfor Stock
The statute validates preincorporation services as eligible consideration for stock, 70 thereby removing the legal cloud from a prevalently
used but controversial form of payment for stock. Future services are
still precluded as a valid form of consideration for stock. Presumably
the rationale is creditor protection, which is an arguable point. The
result is to deprive the close corporation of a useful arrangement where
a stockholder has nothing else to offer except the promise of future
services which are regarded as highly desirable. The statute allows
a promissory note to serve as eligible consideration only if "adequately
secured," which seems of small utility to the close corporation. 71 Partially paid shares may be issued (presumably that means with full voting power and equity buildup) although the dividend must be pro72
portional.
Happily, the statute inters par value and no par value and all of the
foolishness connected with those terms. Section 409(a)(1) simply
provides for the issuance of stock of whatever amount and kind (with
certain disqualifications) of consideration, as determined from time to
time, by either the directors or the shareholders if the articles so provide.
VI.

CLOSE CORPORATION STATUS

A.

Formation

At its inception, a corporation may adopt close corporation status by
including the statutorily prescribed provisions73 in the articles. The
question of consent by all of the potential shareholders at the natal
stage is not covered by the statute. A provision to that effect would have
been desirable. Presumably the courts will enforce a rule requiring
the consent of all of those who are contemplated to be shareholders
of a corporation to be formed as a close corporation.74
70. Id § 409(a)(1).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 409(d).
73. Id. § 158(a).
74. See, e.g., TEE. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (requiring all initial subscribers to be incorporators) and 1d. art. 2.30-1(F) (requiring the affirmative vote-of all outstanding shares of each class in order to elect to change to close
corporation status).
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B.

Election by Existing Corporationand
Terminationby Amendment

An existing non-close corporation may take on close corporation status by an amendment of its articles adding the critical provisions.
Section 158(b) requires the approval of that amendment by the affirmative vote of all of the shares of all classes, even those restricted
or limited as to voting. This prevents a shareholder from being thrust
into a close corporation unwillingly. The unanimity principle should
be consistently followed since the relationship involved is predominantly close-knit and contractual. The statute, however, permits termination of close corporation status by an amendment deleting the crucial definitional provisions by the vote of only two-thirds of each class. 75
The statute expressly allows an agreement for a lesser vote76 and expressly permits agreements to vote for a deletion amendment.77 On
the other hand, nothing is said in section 158 in validation of a requirement of a higher vote for such an amendment or an agreement
not to vote for that step. The former seems clearly permissible under
section 204(a)(5) and the latter under section 706. Nevertheless, the
almost militant insistence in section 158 on the deletion power and the
efforts to facilitate that step seem to suggest that the close corporation
status is somehow confining and should be easily terminated. Far
greater mischief can come from allowing termination of close corporation status without the consent of all shareholders, unless done in accordance with a shareholders' agreement, than from the possibility that
persons might find themselves trapped in that status. The statute
places the planning onus in the wrong place--on the minority shareholder to bargain in advance for a veto against termination of close corporation status. The statute should impose a requirement of unanimity before close corporation status can be divested unless the parties
have otherwise agreed. 78
C. Termination Through Stock Transfers
The statute does effectively provide for the protection of close corporation status against termination by inter vivos transfers of stock de75. GCL, supranote 1, § 158(c).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 158(f).
78. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE tit. 4, § 100(b) (1975). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 346(b) (1974) (allowing any vote greater than two-thirds) and TEx. REv. Cv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-1 (F) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (same).
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signed to or having the effect of putting the corporation in violation
of its shareholder number maximum as imposed by the articles. Section 158(e) provides for termination if shares are transferred or transmitted, or a trust, corporation or partnership is dissolved, and the effect
is to distribute shares to a number of persons in excess of the maximum. But, section 158(e) limits that termination effect to a transfer
which is not void under section 418. Section 418(c) requires a conspicuous legend on the certificate which states the maximum number
of shareholders. The legend must also state that "any attempted voluntary inter vivos transfer which would violate this requirement is
void." The "requirement" referred to is the required maximum which
must be fixed by the articles on the number of shareholders of a close
corporation. The articles must state that maximum, which cannot exceed ten, and the share certificate must contain a statement that the
holders of record cannot exceed that maximum.
The upshot of this is that the shareholders of a close corporation may
fix any limit on their number, up to ten. Compliance with section
418(c) with respect to the share certificate legend triggers section
418(d) which provides that any attempted inter vivos transfer which
would result in violation of that ceiling is void. Section 421 provides
that the holder of shares of a close corporation agrees to the restriction
imposed on transfer for that purpose and waives any right to demand
registration under the Securities Act of 1933.7 9
There is no reason to believe that agreements for the purchase of
stock upon death of a stockholder would not be enforced. An agreement of that kind may solve the problem of preventing transfers on
death which would defeat the status of the corporation as a close corporation. 0
79. Where a transfer of shares is involved in a merger or reorganization which would
effect a termination of close corporation status, sections 1111 and 1201(e) require the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of each class of shares unless a smaller vote is agreed
upon. Section 204(a)(5) permits a higher vote requirement. Section 300(c) prohibits
a contractual waiver or alteration of the rights conferred by sections 1111 and 1201(e).
GCL, supra note 1, §§ 1111, 1201(e), 204(a) (5), 300(c).
80. An option residing in the corporation or other shareholders to purchase stock on
the happening of an event is valid and enforceable. See Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975). The option must be
carefully and explicitly drafted so that the intention is unmistakable as to its application
to the transfer at death. See Riggs v. Midwest Iron & Steel Works, 540 P.2d 361 (Colo.
1975); Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictionsand Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F.
139; 2 0'NEAL, supranote 18, §§ 7.01-.29.
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VII.

AREAS OF INCOMPLETE ATTENTION
CLOSE CORPORATION PROBLEMS

A.

To

Stock TransferRestrictions

A major gap in the California close corporation statutory reform is
the failure to speak to the problem of the legality of stock transfer restrictions. The only substantive mention of this area is in section
204(b) which permits the articles to contain provisions placing "reasonable restrictions" upon the transfer of shares of their hypothecation. 8 ' Hence, the matter is left to the common law. 2 This means
that a restriction which is more stringent than a first option restraint
will continue to be of doubtful reliability as a planning device. The
California cases have upheld the widely used first option but have
never passed upon more stringent restrictions. Outside of California,
the validity of a consent-type restraint is a matter of controversy and
88
uncertainty.
A consent restraint can be a highly desirable planning arrangement.
The first option is often unsatisfactory because neither the corporation
81. Sections 418(a) (1) and 418(b) of the GCL require a conspicuous legend on the
share certificate of the existence of a stock transfer restriction to make it enforceable
against a transferee without actual notice. For the meaning of conspicuous legend, see
Leng & Co. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972), rev'g 470 S.W.2d
441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) discussed in case note, 50 TEXAs L. RPv. 528 (1972). See
also Lebowitz, Corporations: Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. LJ. 85 (1973).
Other corporation statutes which address the close corporation affairs go quite far in
sustaining restraints on transfer. Delaware validates consent and other restraints,
including one designed to preserve the Subchapter S status. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
202 (1974).
Maryland upsets the entire analytical applecart by revolutionary provisions inspired by
the partnership doctrine of delectus personae. This doctrine is codified in UNIFORM
P.Ammismp AcT § 18(g): "No person can become a member of a partnership without
the consent of all the partners." Id. The Maryland provisions prohibit any transfer of
stock without the recent written consent of all other holders of stock. MD. ANN. CODE
tit. 4, § 4-504(b)(1) (1975). The shareholder denied consent to transfer his stock is
given a dissolution right, id. § 4-602(b) (1) (i); the other shareholders are given a corollary buyout right to stave off dissolution. Id. § 4-603 (a). This is all made subject to a
contrary unanimous stockholders' agreement, which may provide for merely a first-option arrangement or which may abrogate the dissolution right.
82. The right of first refusal or first option was upheld in Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d
1119 (9th Cir. 1970); Ta-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828,
38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964); Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932).
83. An interesting compromise position on consent restraints is worked out by the
court in Fayard v. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421 (Miss. 1974). See also Rafe v. Hindin, 288
N.Y.S.2d 662, 29 App. Div. 2d 481 (Sup. CL 1968).
On consent restraints see generally 2 O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 7.08; Bradley, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 139, 141.
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nor the other shareholders may be able to purchase. Planning, however, is not an exercise in legal pioneering. A first option had better
be provided for in all cases as a backstop to another more stringent
restriction."4
Section 204(b) makes the transfer restriction unenforceable against
non-consenting outstanding shares when the restriction is introduced by
an amendment to the articles.85 This new portion is well advised and
it heightens the importance of planning at the outset on this matter.
The adventuresome planner may be interested in experimenting
with section 204(a)(3) which authorizes an optional provision in the
articles establishing "special qualifications" for shareholders. That
provision suggests some rather exotic and stringent limitations even to
the point of actually naming specific people who alone are to be qualified as shareholders, subject to amendment only by unanimous consent.8 6 If the "reasonable restriction" provision of section 204(b)
takes precedence, any provision establishing qualifications for shareholders which is, as a practical matter, more restrictive than a first option would be subject to great legal doubt.
If the shareholders wish to allow the transfer of stock during lifetime
or at death, or to allow the distribution of the trust, corporation or partnership stock, they may enlarge the shareholder maximum stated in the
articles, but not beyond the statutory ceiling of ten. It is unclear
whether the effect of section 158(b) is to require the consent of all
shareholders to that amendment. That construction would best comport with the spirit of the close corporation provisions generally and
that section in particular. In any case, a high-vote requirement to
guard against the proliferation of shareholders through the increase in
the shareholder maximum should be considered at the planning stage
along with a specific provision allowing an amendment for that purpose
by a lesser vote, down to a majority, if that is what the parties desire.
84. A very helpful provision, considering the uncertainty respecting the legality of
restrictions, would have been one similar to a Delaware provision which confers upon the
corporation an option to purchase the stock if a restriction is declared unenforceable.
DEL. COD ANN. tit. 8, § 349 (1974).
85. This provision overrules Tu-Vu Drive-In v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d
828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964).
86. The Delaware close corporation provisions also permit the certificate of incorporation to set forth the qualifications of stockholders. However, the following language
restricts the potential broad use of such a qualification provision: qualifications may be
set forth "either by specifying classes of persons who shall be entitled to be holders of
record of stock of any class, or by specifying classes of persons who shall not be entitled
to be holders of stock of any class or both." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(b) (1974).
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B.

Dissolution

1. Voluntary Dissolution Agreements or Vetoes
The California statute omits a provision commonly found in other
state close corporation legislation 87 permitting shareholders to agree
that any shareholder has the right to dissolution at will or upon the happening of a specified event or contingency. 8 The two major substantive provisions make no mention of dissolution, but arguably, section
300(b) 9 would validate such an agreement on the ground that it is
merely an effort to introduce a right comparable to one which a partner may enjoy. 90 And section 706(a) makes mention of no specific
application; rather it very broadly validates shareholder voting agreements. Even if section 300(b) does not support a dissolution agreement, a section 706(a) shareholder voting agreement seems to be all
that is needed since director involvement is not required under California's unique voluntary dissolution provision. 91 An agreement among
shareholders to vote for dissolution on demand of any one of them or
on the occurrence of a specified event or the happening of a given contingency, reinforced in an irrevocable proxy for self-implementation,
would seem to be valid at first blush. Nevertheless, that construction is
to be gravely doubted no matter how devoutly one argues for it. The
omission from the statute of a dissolution-on-demand provision is a
compelling fact militating against that construction of section 300(b) or
section 706(a). A most telling point is the unique character of the California voluntary dissolution provision which allows dissolution, without
a director vote, on the vote of "shareholders holding shares representing fifty percent or more of the voting power."9 That seems to suggest
a sacrosanct voting provision. On one aspect of that question, the legislation is very emphatic. The authorization in section 204(a)(5) for
provisions in the articles requiring high votes is made explicitly inappli87. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANr. tit. 8, § 355(a) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §
1002(a) (McKinney 1974); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-5(A) (Cum. Supp.
1975).
88. Section 204(a) (4) of the GCL allows articles to contain a provision which limits
the duration of the corporation's existence. Conceivably, the articles could define the
term of the corporation by reference to a contingency such as the failure of the business
to show a certain profit level on the termination of employment of a named person.
More fanciful is the possibility of stating that the corporate existence endures only so
long as all shareholders consent.
89. See text accompanying notes 12, 22 supra.

90. See

UNwoFm PA TNERsNmp

ACT § 31(1)(b).

91. GCL, supra note 1, § 1900 et seq.
92. Id. § 1900(a).
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cable to the section 1900 voting procedure. Therefore, it is very hard
to attribute to the legislature an intention to allow section 706(a) to
be used for a shareholder agreement to the effect that shareholders will
vote against a voluntary dissolution resolution unless all shareholders
agree on dissolution. While that may be plain enough in connection
with an agreement giving a veto against dissolution, it is still possible
to argue that an agreement on a lesser vote for dissolution is permitted
by the statute. No good reason exists why that kind of an agreement
should not be found to be valid. The policy supporting section 1900
is far from clear. In departing from the usual director resolution and
two-thirds or majority shareholder vote procedure for the fifty percent
shareholder vote provision, the legislature does not seem to be declaring a policy strongly opposed to agreements allowing dissolution on the
wish of a lesser number than half of the shares entitled to elect directors. Nor does such an agreement seem offensive to the judicial
gloss which has been placed upon the dissolution provision by the California courts. The California Supreme Court has held that dissolution
may occur only if that move is "equitable"; that is, the parties seeking
dissolution may not gain some unfair advantage as a result of the dissolution. 93 Although that limitation is an important equitable restraint
on the exercise of power granted by the statute, it is similar to what
other courts have done with respect to the more conventional dissolution provisions94 and it does not amount to a judicial bias against agreements which confer, in effect, a dissolution-on-demand right.
Section 2000 allows the corporation or other shareholders to purchase the stock of a stockholder seeking dissolution. A fair price must
be paid but a reduction is allowed for damages if the dissolution proceeding, according to the statute, is initiated in breach of an agreement.
The agreement referred to would seem to have to be an agreement
not to exercise the section 1900 voluntary dissolution power. If that
is the most likely interpretation, then the implication is that an agreement of that kind is valid to the extent of serving as the basis of a reduction in the price to be paid in the exercise of the statutory buy-out right.
But if that is correct, how can it be reconciled with the prohibition
against using the section 204(a) (5) high-vote provision in the articles
in connection with voluntary dissolution under section 1900? Perhaps
the answer is that the owners of fifty percent are to be free to exercise
93. See In re Security Fin. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957).
94. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 675 (1942).
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a statutory power to seek dissolution but must face the price-diminution

effect of an agreement not to do so. There is precedent for an approach of this kind since the Uniform Partnership Act provides for
essentially that same power for each partner.9 5
If it is concluded that an agreement is valid under section 706(a)
to vote for dissolution at the request of any shareholder on demand
so as to satisfy the fifty percent requirement for dissolution under section 1900, will the courts respond by taking a strict view of when dissolution is "equitable" under the Security Finance test? 96 There is
no way at this time to know the answer to that question.
The statute surely could have dealt with voluntary dissolution and
the special problems of the close corporation with greater clarity and
liberality. As the statute stands, it is in some respects unduly restrictive and in others it is ambivalent. Dissolution should not be an exception to the general principle of freedom of contract for close corporation planning. No basis exists for clinging in this one area to the
statutory "norm" approach immune to change by a shareholders' agreement. It is possible to speculate that the present state of the statute is
due to the belief that the parties may not know what is best for them and
the court should always have the opportunity to pass on the "equity,"
that is, the wisdom of the dissolution. That brand of paternalism has
haunted close corporation planning97 and is completely out of step with
section 300(b).
2. Involuntary Dissolution
The failure of the statute to come to grips with the problem of unfairness and oppression adequately, as discussed later in this article, 98
and the absence of a statutory license to enter into a free-wheeling dissolution agreement, may be offset to some extent by the intelligent use
of the planning devices which are provided for. Cases of faulty or no
planning are inevitable, however. The breadth and enlightenment of
the California statutory provisions on involuntary dissolution compensate somewhat for those facts.
95. UNwoRm PARTNmsmp Acr §§ 31(1)(b), 38(2) (a) (H).
96. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 60 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1945)
where the court commented that, "Such a by-law (requiring unanimity for board action)
...is, almost as a matter of law, unworkable and unenforceable for the reason (that)
• . .'in all acts done by a corporation, the major number must bind the lesser, or else
differences could never be determined.'" Id. at 831.
98. See notes 115-36 infra and accompanying text.
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Section 1800(a)(2) permits any shareholder of a close corporation
to file a complaint for involuntary dissolution. 9° Subsection (b) of section 1800 enumerates the conditions that must be met and sets forth
the criteria to be satisfied for a grant of dissolution or other appropriate relief.' 00 Of particular interest are sections 1800(b)(4) and (5). The
former section makes reference to "persistent unfairness" toward
any shareholder by those in control as a basis upon which dissolution
may be sought. An expansive reading of that section will contribute
a great deal toward the protection of minority stockholders against the
classic freeze-out. Of special consequence would be the recognition
that the majority shareholders may be acting unfairly despite the fact
that they are exercising literally lawful statutory majority voting prerogatives and seemingly legitimate business judgment privileges. Subsection (5) of section 1800(b) is potentially much more far-reaching in
its effect and seems to be quite deliberately intended as a response to
the need for protective devices for minority shareholders.' 0 ' The subsection provides:

In the case of any corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders (determined as provided in Section 605), liquidation is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or shareholders'1 02

Neither of the above sections includes a deadlock or corporate paralysis
requirement. Section 1800(b)(5) can be understood as having been
quite deliberately not weighted in favor of a policy of prolonging the
life of the corporation at the possible expense of minority shareholder
interests. A court may use it to come to the rescue of a shareholder
who is victimized by an exclusion from meaningful participation in the
management or in the spoils of the business, whether salaries or dividends, although those in control are guilty of no fiduciary violation by
traditional standards.
The ground for dissolution appearing in section 1800(b)(5) also
appears in the present version of the California Corporation Code,
99. Section 1800(e) allows a beneficial owner of shares who has entered into a
shareholders' agreement to also file a dissolution petition. It should be kept in mind that
section 300(c) outlaws any shareholder agreement altering or waiving any of the
provisions of Chapter 18. GCL, supra note 1, §§ 1800(e), 300(c)
100. Section 1804 of the GCL empowers the court to "make such orders and decrees
and issue such injunctions in the case as justice and equity require."
101. See F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEzE-OUTs" OF MiNonrny SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR
OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssocIAurEs §§ 9.09-.14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL
OPPRESSION].

102. GCL, supranote 1, § 1800(b) (5).
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though without the limitation to corporations of thirty-five or fewer
shareholders.'10 3 That provision was construed in the case of Stumpf
v. Stumpf & Sons, Inc.'04 as precluding a dissolution-on-demand approach. The California Court of Appeal held that the remedy of dissolution was not there for the asking on an automatic relief basis;
rather, a showing of "fairness" must support that drastic measure. 105
But the dissolution provision was held to have an independent significance of its own and, on the facts, the court did grant the requested
relief. 106 The thrust of the opinion is important to the instant discussion.
The legislature was taken to have manifested an intention to empower
the courts to assure fairness to minority shareholders. 07 The enactment
of the subsection in the present statute, including a new departure for
the close corporation and its distinct needs, should fortify the manifestation of that intention and give the subsection an even greater vigor
and significance as a judicial tool for sheltering minority shareholders
from unfairness and oppression. But a particular court's attitude is
crucial. Feelings favorable to majority rights based on a mistaken view
of their rightful place in a close corporation or a prejudice in favor of
keeping a profitable business going despite an embittered relationship
may cut against dissolution when it is the only sensible or fair thing
for the minority. Judicial reactions to complaints for dissolution, it is
to be hoped, will show a keen sensitivity to the minority shareholder
who is suffering due to inadequate planning or the lack of fairness by
the majority.
The broad planning avenues open to the parties under the new statute and whether they are comprehensively used in a given case will
probably weigh heavily in a court's judgment when involuntary dissolution is sought. There is much to be said for the adage that one who
has made his own bed should be made to lie in it. But it can be overdone. For example, mandatory buy-out agreements are available for
use as alternatives to dissolution-at-will contracts. These argreements are
not panaceas. They have their practical limitations. The absence of
planning may be due to economic reasons or ignorance. A court may
103. CAL. CORP. CODM ANN. § 4651(f) (West 1955).
104. 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975).
105. Id. at 235, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
106. For a discussion of the need for greater flexibility in meeting the dissolution
problem of minority shareholders see Comment, Dissolution Under the California
Corporations Code: A Remedy for Minority Shareholders, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 595
(1975).
107. Stumpf v. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674
(1975).
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determine that the parties in a given case faced the dissolution and corporate captivity issues and all of them may have freely chosen to adopt
a plan which actively discouraged dissolution as a matter of the very
clear and firm intention of the parties. Many business reasons suggest
that approach in many cases. Hence, the parties may have consciously
elected, after consultation with counsel, to forego an arrangement affording an easy exit from the close corporation. It is true that the
statute expressly proscribes the use of a section 300(b) agreement to
waive the right to seek dissolution under section 1800,108 and that is
as it should be as a matter of wise statutory policy. However, a court
is entitled to exercise its discretion under subsections (4) and (5) of
section 1800(b) and resolve doubts against dissolution on behalf of the
complainant in the face of that expressed intention to promote the continued existence of the business and to live with a carefully workedout governance and profit division plan. 1 9
Section 1804 gives the court flexibility as to the form of relief to
be granted in these involuntary dissolution cases." 0 Orders requiring
dividend payments could be issued or perhaps a stockholder disenfranchised if the situation seemed to warrant that form of relief."' The
reluctance of the court to become so deeply involved in the affairs
of a close corporation would be understandable. Section 2000 provides for a buy-out by the corporation, or by the holders of fifty percent
or more of the stock of the shareholder who seeks dissolution, except
in the case of "persistent unfairness."" 2
C.

DefinitionalProblems

The definitional tack taken in the California statute is to make status
as a close corporation ever optional. On the other hand, the definition
108. GCL, supra note 1, § 300(e).
109. The parties may, for example, have entered into arrangements for arbitration as a
means of settling disagreement instead of resorting to efforts to secure dissolution. For
a treatment of arbitration and its uses, see 2 O'NEAL, supra note 18, §§ 9.08-.25. In
addition, section 308 of the GCL authorizes a petition for the appointment of a
provisional director, under limited circumstances. For a discussion of that device, see
2 'NEAL, supra note 18, § 9.30.
110. See note 101 supra.
111. For examples of innovative solutions, see O'NEAL - OPPRESSION, supra note 101,
§ 9.05.
112. A suit for liquidation by a minority shareholder under a similar statute, based
upon allegations of oppression and waste of assets was not precluded by a bylaw
conferring a buy-out-at-will right at par value. The stockholder was permitted to
attempt to get a better deal in dissolution if the criteria were met. Baylor v. Baylor
Book Co., 216 S.E.2d 18 (Va. 1975).
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operates to deny that status to non-complying corporations, so that if
a corporation cannot show itself to be eligible under the definitional
requirements of section 158, the shareholders cannot avail themselves
of the special contractual privileges reserved for the close corporation.
Two aspects of that definitional approach deserve discussion. The
matter of qualification by number of shareholders is the lesser problem.
Whether this new status should have been required of all corporations
which fit a statutory definition, that is, whether it should have been
mandatory is a much more fundamental policy question.
1. The Number of Shareholders Limitation
The numerical limitation of ten, or any other number, is necessarily
arbitrary. 113 It does not follow that this is a wrong approach. The
issue does not seem to be an acute one, in any event. The accommodation of corporations with up to ten shareholders of record will provide
for the overwhelming number of corporations which feel the need of
special close corporation laws to a significant degree. Excluding from
the statutory coverage corporations with a greater number of shareholders should not handicap planning in those corporations unduly
since the general statutory provisions do not constitute a planning
straightjacket by any means. Nor should the ceiling unduly hamper
the raising of sufficient investment capital. Venture capital corporations are eligible close corporation shareholders and debt securities may
be given voting rights. On the one hand, the position may be taken
that where the number of shareholders is greater than ten, agreements
affecting board discretion should be either outrightly invalid or at least
that they become enough of a worry to require ad hoc judicial scrutiny
for their validation. On the other hand is the contention that if all of
the shareholders consent to the agreement, what is the objection to the
use of special planning arrangements in corporations with a larger num11 4
ber of shareholders?
113. Nevertheless, the statute is rigid on this requirement. Section 300(c) of the
GCL prohibits the use of a section 300(b) shareholders' agreement to alter or waive the
ten-shareholder requirement.
114. The proponents of the California legislation originally thought that thirty-five
was an appropriate maximum. ExPosuRE DRAFT no. 2, supra note 10, at 6. Delaware
fixes the number at 30, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a) (1) (1974), and Texas at 35
TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-1(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

Not every state with close corporation statutes has adopted a definition including a
numerical limitation of shareholders. New York prescribes no number limitation but
requires all shareholders to consent to agreements affecting board discretion. N.Y. Bus.
Conp. Law § 620(b)(1) (McKinney 1974). New York also makes the absence of
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2. Mandatory Close Corporation Status-Herein of
Minimum Rights for Close Corporation Shareholders
Unplanned or poorly planned close corporations will always be with
us. The sad fact is that oppression and fraud and the corporate freezeout1 15 will not disappear under the new California General Corporation
Law because the statute authorizes shareholders' agreements to deal
with the problems of the close corporation over a broad front. Hence,
the legislative treatment of the special problems of the close corporation is incomplete unless attention is given to the minimization of the
possibilities of unfairness and oppression. The liberation of planning
moves in the right direction by giving shareholders the opportunity to
protect themselves by agreement. However the statute cannot assure the fullest or wisest use of its provisions in that regard. A further
necessary step is to apply certain statutory provisions to all corporations
fitting a statutory definition of the close corporation for the purpose
of establishing a set of ground rules to govern the relationship of the
parties in the absence of agreement, except in some cases. The
ground rules could be similar to those promulgated by the Uniform
Partnership Act which confers important basic rights on each partner.
Those rights are regarded as inherently residing in someone involved
in a partnership relationship and are therefore presumably intended by
the parties absent a contrary agreement.
The ground rules which now apply to the corporation establish the
rights of majorities to elect directors, amend the articles, and the like,
and hence to govern the corporation, determine employment, salaries,
dividends and other matters. The majority's actions are carried out
under the protective umbrella of the business judgment rule and misgeneral trading in the share a pre-condition to agreements affecting board discretion. Id.
§ 620(c).
Another alternative to be found in other statutes is the Maryland approach. Maryland
simply requires that the .charter of a close corporation contain a statement that the
corporation is a close corporation with no further requirement as to the number of
shareholders or other definitional element. MD. ANN. CODE tit. 4, § 4-101(b) (1975).
For an evaluation of the Maryland statute, which the author regards as the most
successful close corporation legislation to date, see Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation
of the Delaware andMaryland Close CorporationStatutes, 1968 DuKn L.I. 525.
115. Professor O'Neal's book on the subject of oppression and other forms of
maltreatment of minority shareholders, O'NEAL - OPPRESSION supra note 101, provides a
superb exposition and meticulous documentation of the underlying causes and techniques
of the close corporation "squeeze-out" and other oppressive conduct. He notes that the
traditional corporation statutory tilt in favor of the majority shareholders contributes a
great deal to the problem. Id. § 1.03. The need for a lengthy book dealing with this
dismal phenomenon displays the need for corrective legislation.
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placed, at least in the close corporation, notions of democratic processes.
Often this adds up to a legally sanctioned blueprint for the freeze-out.
If the minority shareholders are to escape from this predicament, the
planning onus is on them to gain voting vetoes or other protective devices as a particular statute might allow. This situation is part of the
fallout from the fact that close corporation statutes have been structured
with the widely-held corporation as the backdrop.
Close corporation statutes should take the great leap forward of defining close corporation status on a mandatory basis and of decreeing
certain basic rights for all shareholders in those corporations. The objective would be to minimize oppression and unfairness while preserving the freedom of the parties to determine their own fates by contract.
A perspective on this proposal can be gained from a consideration of
the approach taken in the Uniform Partnership Act. That statute imposes partnership status on relationships which possess the elements of
the statutory definition.1 1 Once the elusive "co-ownership" of a business is found to be present, partnership status attaches. At the same
time, it will help to recall that the partnership statute contains a number
of provisions which apply to the partnership as defined, either of the inadvertent variety, or the more common case, the consciously and deliberately formed partnership. Many of those provisions constitute
ground rules designed to give each partner a fair shake. The wealth
of common law gives fuller delineation to these presumed basic rights
of each participant in the business. The partners, regardless of investment differences, stand on an equal footing with regard to manageabsent an agreement otherwise. For exment 17 and profit sharing,'
ample, all partners must consent to salaries." 9 The planning onus
is on those who would have it otherwise. The risk of a situation involving little or no contractual coverage of these matters is not put on
minority participants. Ordinary business matters are open to majority
decision making, but extraordinary change cannot be wrought without
unanimity.12 0 In addition, new ownership interests cannot be created
and existing partnership rights may not be transferred without the consent of all the partners. 1 1 The natural result of the contractual
116.

UNmFORM PARTNERsmP ACT

117. Id. § 18(e).
118. Id. § 18(a).

119. Id. § 18(f).
120. Id.§ 18(h).
121. Id.§ 27.

§§ 6,7.
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close-knit and interdependent relationship is that the law confers substantial protection against a "freeze-out."
In contrast, the definitional approach adopted in the California statute leaves the status as a close corporation a matter of optional provisions in the articles. This remains the approach taken everywhere, except in one state which does not use the mandatory definition for any
significant practical purpose."22 Without a mandatory definition, close
corporations-in-fact cannot be reached by statutory provisions which
are designed to guarantee basic rights for all shareholders of a close corporation. Even as to those corporations which elect the status, the statute does not attempt to prescribe a set of basic rights to be enjoyed
by all of its shareholders. Since the routine, or badly planned close
corporation will doubtless recur with dreary frequency, that statutory
omission is unfortunate. Majorities will continue to be able to make
bread and butter crucial decisions with inadequate judicial protection
against unfairness.123 Moreover, the statutory provisions for involuntary dissolution are not a satisfactory answer.
Therefore it is the submission of this article that close corporation
legislation should define a close corporation in a manner which impresses that legal status on all corporations which conform to that definition without resort to an option to elect the status. A definition of
the close corporation might well take the form of the California definition with respect to the number of shareholders,1 24 i.e., that every
corporation having no more than ten shareholders would be included.
With that first essential step taken, the statute could then apply the au122. The Maine statute defines a close corporation as a corporation with shares
formed under the laws of the state of Maine which "at any given time, has not more than
20 shareholders of all classes of shares, whether or not entitled to vote." ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 102(s) (Supp. 1972). This definition is not qualified so as to make
close corporation status a matter of optional provision in the articles.
The Maine statute permits a close corporation to establish management by shareholders. Id. § 701(2). The only other references to the close corporation in the statute
relate to the power of incorporators, id. § 407(5), and the list of shareholders, id. §
607(2) (B).
123. The unwillingness of the courts to deal with this problem persists. Dissolution
was recently withheld despite a showing that a professional corporation was being
continued for the purpose of paying a salary and bonus to the majority while dividends
had ceased. Home v. Radiological Health Services, P.C., 83 Misc. 2d 446, 371 N.Y.S.2d
948 (Sup. Ct. 1975). For further discussion of the dissolution aspect of this problem,
see O'NEAL - OPPRESSION supra note 101, §§ 9.04 - .14.
124. GCL, supra note 1, § 158(a).
For a discussion of the definitional problem and a defense of the ten-shareholder
approach in a mandatory definition, see Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145, 1189-95 (1966).
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thorizations for shareholders' agreements on a broad scale to all such
corporations. 1 25 The final step would be to declare a set of minimum
rights to be enjoyed by all shareholders of the close corporation. Forthe most part, the statutory ground rules would be subject to the agreement of the parties.
A program conferring basic rights for all shareholders of a close corporation should give the highest priority to an equality of rights with
regard to management and profit division. The traditional corporate
practice conditions persons to think in terms of rights attaching to
shares of stock instead of to people. Once again that is the result of
focusing on the corporation as the form of business organization appropriate for the business owned by a great many persons, most of them
possessing rather small proportionate interests, whose identities matter
little and who tend to be nomadic. The principle that each participant
in a close corporation is presumptively entitled to an equal share of
the profits and an equal voice in management accords with the personal, contractual and fiduciary relationship which characterizes that
form of business unit. Of course, profit division and management
would be subject to the agreement of the parties, but the planning onus
would be to establish by agreement of all of the participants some arrangement other than equality as to management and profits. As in
the partnership, salaries to partners would be deemed to be merely the
receipt of that participant's share of the profits absent agreement.
The compelling need and logic for steps analogous to the recommendations made in this article have been persuasively argued by commentators with respect to piecemeal statutory provisions designed to protect
minority shareholders of the close corporation. The most eminent
writer on the problems of the close corporation has urged a statute
which compels the payment of a dividend.126 While this suggestion
may not meet with universal assent, 2 7 the idea has cogent force behind
it and it represents the kind of minimum right which could be debated
125. There is a precedent in the California statute for using a mandatory definition to
apply provisions to only certain corporations. Section 2100 applies to a foreign
corporation doing intrastate business. Section 2115(a) and (b) sets forth a formulaic
definition which singles out some foreign corporations and applies some of the provisions
of the general corporation statute to those corporations. For example, section 708 which
mandates cumulative voting applies to those covered corporations. GCL, supra note 1,
§§ 2100, 2115(a), 2115(b), 708.
126. O'NEAL - OPPRESSION, supra note 101, § 9.06.
127. Professor Folk disagrees with this proposal. Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina
CorporationLaw: The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.
CA. L. REv. 768, 842-45 (1965).
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as properly includible in a statute which mandates close corporation
status for the purpose of conferring minimum rights. Another wellreasoned proposal recommends legislation conferring upon close corporation shareholders a special dissolution right. 28 Another matter
highly eligible for this kind of treatment would be the right to information about the business and affairs of the close corporation. 12 These
and other rights would be affirmed in a statute of the type proposed
after considered discussion of the needs of minority shareholders and
the rights of majorities. The decision would then have to be made
concerning to what extent to make these matters in the alternative subject to the agreement of the parties.
A mandatory definitional approach in a close corporation statute
would also serve the very important purpose of providing a launching
pad for a statutory declaration that a stringent fiduciary duty adheres
to the close corporation relationship. The judicial recognition of that
fiduciary duty is evidenced by the recent case of Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co.180 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court describes the fiduciary duty among close corporation shareholders as
more insistent than the traditional director duty and as similar to the
fiduciary duty among partners.' 31 Another recent case adds the important point that in the close corporation it is the personal relationship
which creates the duty of loyalty and not merely the capacity as officer
or director. 13 2 Hence the duty not to compete is endemic to the relationship among the shareholders and not merely an adjunct of the representative status.133
128. Hetherington, Special Characteristics,Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 22,
Partners are afforded an analogous dissolution power. UNiFoam PARTNER HiP Acr §§

31 and 38(2) (a) (11).
129. A recent case declined enforcement of a shareholders' agreement on the ground
that the shareholder had proceeded without complete information. Dresden v. Wilock,
518 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1975).
130. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). Judge Fuld's dissent in Kruger v. Gerth, 263
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, 210 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1965) is a very insightful description of the close
corporation fiduciary relationship.
131. 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975). For a discussion of the fiduciary duty among
partners, see J. CRANE &A. BROmBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHip § 68 (1968).
132. Cain v. Cain, 334 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. Ct. App. 1975). The court held that
competition by a stockholder was discordant with the duty of loyalty among the close
corporation associates regardless of the competitor's status as an officer, director or
merely as a stockholder.
133. Although the stress in this article is upon the problem of majority oppression of
minority shareholders, that should not be understood as being based on a view that the
close corporation fiduciary duty is a one-way street. Obviously, it rests upon each
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The legislative proposal advanced in this article would seem to be
the logical extension of the principle that the close corporation is an
incorporated partnership. Unfortunately, that principle is sometimes
misunderstood. That misunderstanding finds form in the objection
that if the business participants are to have their partnership cake they
must eat limited liability. But surely that is merely the tired and discredited argument that to be worthy of treatment as a corporation the
shareholders must obey corporation norms and rituals. The California
statute, as does a great quantity of legislation today, already confounds
those arguments in section 300(b) by validation of far-reaching partnership-like agreements and practices in the close corporation.
The Texas close corporation reform embodied a mandatory definition of the close corporation when it first appeared. 8 4 The statute was
soon amended, however, so that it now makes close corporation status
optional. When it was first enacted any corporation which met the
definition was a close corporation. The willingness of the parties was
irrelevant and the status was assumed irrespective of an oition. But
those who ride herd on the Texas statute decided that accidental birth
was not a good idea. The fact that the substantive provisions were all
permissive would make it appear that the mandatory definition really
didn't matter that much. The decision to amend the statute and
make close corporation status optional was based on a variety of reasons, according to the Comment of the Bar Committee which now accompanies the new version of the statute.'3 5 The first reason was to
allow fewer than all of the shareholders to enter into agreements
which do not constitute "significant variations from the statutory norm."
As pointed out earlier in this article in the discussion of section 706(a),
acceding to that reason may have been based on the erroneous view
that shareholder voting agreements among less than all of the shareparticipant and is a fully reciprocal duty. See Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of
Loyalty in Close Corporations,1972 DuKE L.J. 921. For an application of the duty of a
minority shareholder, see Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Judge
Burger wrote:
In an intimate business venture such as this, stockholders of a close corporation
occupy a position similar to that of joint adventurers and partners. While courts
have sometimes declared stockholders "do not bear toward each other that same
relation of trust and confidence which prevails in partnerships," this view ignores
the practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small "two-man" corporation organized to carry on a small business enterprise in which the stockholders,
directors and managers are the same persons.
Id. at 486 (footnotes omitted).
134. See Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2.30-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975), Comment of Bar
Committee.
135. Id.
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holders do not pose a serious threat to minority shareholders. Hence,
it is submitted, with great deference to the draftsmen of the most admirable Texas close corporation provisions, that it would have been appropriate to allow the statute to have the effect of requiring that in all
close corporations in fact, so to speak, all of the shareholders must consent to agreements affecting director discretion to any degree or shareholder voting. The other reasons for the amendment to the Texas statute to make the status optional do not seem to have required that
drastic step but could have been responded to by other statutory corrections and clarifications.130 Had the statute not been amended, the
experiment could have been undertaken to extend minimum rights to
all of the shareholders of the close corporation as statutorily defined.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The great need to establish a friendly legal environment for close
corporation planning has been treated in the California statute and

elsewhere by a wholesale liberation of the contractual planning right.
The ultimate quest is still unrealized. A broadside statutory attack
upon unfairness and oppression in the close corporation is now needed.

It is a highly worthwhile social objective.

136. The other reason assigned for dispensing with the mandatory definition was that
the close corporation shareholders' agreement is required by the statute to be in the
articles or bylaws so that if it is not, worry arises over-its validity. Id. But, of course,
the solution is simply to do as is done in California and provide that the agreement may
be contained in a separate shareholders' agreement apart from any formal corporate
document such as articles or bylaws. Purchasers of stock are protected by legend
requirements on the share certificates, if they do not have actual notice which they aren't
likely to get from the articles or bylaws ankway. Another reason was concern that
under the mandatory definition of a close corporation, its shareholders could block a
public offering or any effort to sell more shares. Id. The answer to that objection is
clearly that a shareholders' agreement may provide for the issuance of new stock on the
vote of a majority of the shares if that is what the parties want. The final objection was
that the provisional director provision applied to all close corporations. Id. But that
could be taken care of without abandoning the mandatory definition. The provisional
director provision is of very marginal utility, for that matter, and it would have been
better to scrap it instead.

